The differentiation in development levels across industries is striking: some sectors like technology and new energy continue to post rising profits, while catering, retail, and real estate struggle under the weight of consumption downgrades and cost pressures, highlighting the pain of economic restructuring. Take the apparel industry as an example: in 2024, the Chinese apparel industry presents a stark "pyramid effect."
According to data from the China National Garment Association and the National Bureau of Statistics, the total profit of China's above-scale apparel enterprises (annual main business revenue of 20 million RMB or above) in 2024 reached 62.381 billion RMB. This profit covers 13,820 above-scale enterprises, representing the industry's main body.
Among them, 64 listed companies achieved a net profit of 31.51 billion RMB, with the top ten enterprises accounting for 96% of listed companies' total profits. ANTA alone contributed 15.596 billion RMB in net profit — nearly half. On the other side, vast numbers of small and medium enterprises struggle to survive in a price war, with the menswear category even seeing a "double hit" of a 10% sales volume decline and 9% drop in average transaction value.
Even more striking is the imbalance between platform economy and the real economy: Alibaba's 2024 fiscal year attributable net profit of 157.479 billion RMB is equivalent to 2.5 times the total net profit of the entire apparel industry. This distorted distribution mechanism forces enterprises to rethink: online traffic costs erode profits while platforms hold the data dividend. Where does the traditional model go from here?
The Missing Data Sovereignty in the E-Commerce Era
Among China's major platforms, Alibaba's share of apparel is relatively high compared to other platforms. When Jack Ma founded Alibaba, the mission was "making it easy to do business anywhere" — but the echoes of that promise are fading as the apparel sector, supposedly an easy business to run, now faces enormous challenges: insufficient demand, cutthroat price competition, and stark polarization.
In recent years, Burgeon has expanded into industries beyond apparel, such as food, 3C, FMCG, home furnishings, ceramics and sanitary ware, and hardware and building materials. Admittedly, under current economic conditions, everyone is struggling — or at least not doing as well as before. But apparel enterprises face even greater difficulties. Food, clothing, shelter, and transportation: apparel should be a massive industry. Why is it so struggling? Is the apparel industry somehow very traditional and backward? From the perspective of digitalization level, the apparel industry outpaces other traditional industries decisively. If the industry's scale, importance, and advancement are all high, yet the entire sector can't make money, while a platform company serving the industry earns 2.5 times the industry's total profit — what is the reason? How did it come to this?
We believe the answer is data sovereignty.
When a customer buys clothes at a Tmall store, does the merchant know who this customer is — where they came from, where they went? Which products did they browse? How did they make their decision? What product attributes attracted them? The merchant made a sale and possibly earned money, but the entire process is a black box — while the platform holds all of this process data. In other words, the platform has data sovereignty, and the merchant does not. Analyzing the merchant-platform relationship from a data sovereignty perspective: it appears the platform serves the merchant, offering numerous paid services. But since the final data lies with the platform, accumulated value accrues to the platform. The real relationship is that merchants serve the platform — and on top of that, pay for the privilege.
